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Higher security and lower failure probability have always been people’s pursuits in quantum-
oblivious-key-transfer-based private query (QOKT-PQ) protocols since Jacobi et al. [Phys. Rev.
A 83, 022301 (2011)] proposed the first protocol of this kind. However, higher database security
generally has to be obtained at the cost of a higher failure probability, and vice versa. Recently,
based on a round-robin differential-phase-shift quantum key distribution protocol, Liu et al. [Sci.
China-Phys. Mech. Astron.58, 100301 (2015)] presented a private query protocol (RRDPS-PQ
protocol) utilizing ideal single-photon signal which realizes both ideal database security and zero
failure probability. However, ideal single-photon source is not available today, and for large database
the required pulse train is too long to implement. Here, we reexamine the security of RRDPS-
PQ protocol under imperfect source and present an improved protocol using a special “low-shift
and addition” (LSA) technique, which not only can be used to query from large database but also
retains the features of “ideal database security” and “zero-failure” even under weak coherent source.
Finally, we generalize the LSA technique and establish a generic QOKT-PQ model in which both
“ideal database security” and “zero failure” are achieved via acceptable communications.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk
I. INTRODUCTION
Private information retrieval [1, 2], allows a user Al-
ice to retrieve an item (which is generally supposed to
be a bit) xi from a database x1x2 · · ·xN without disclos-
ing the retrieval address i to the database holder Bob
(user privacy). Symmetrically private information re-
trieval (SPIR) [3] concerns one more requirement named
“database security”, that is, Alice should not get more
information than her wanted item from database. As
database security and user privacy are in conflict, the
task of SPIR cannot be realized ideally even in quantum
cryptography [4]. Quantum private query (QPQ) [5], the
quantum scheme for SPIR, generally relaxes the secu-
rity as follows. Alice can elicit several items instead of
the ideal requirement (i.e., just one item) from database,
and Bob’s attack to guess user’s retrieval address will be
detected with a nonzero probability (cheat-sensitivity).
Earlier QPQ protocols [5–7] based on oracle operations
show great significance in theory, but they are not loss-
tolerant and for large database the dimension of the or-
acle operation would be too high to implement.
In 2011, Jakobi et al. [8] proposed a private query pro-
tocol (J-protocol) based on SARG04 quantum key dis-
tribution (QKD) protocol [9]. Concretely, Alice and Bob
first share a raw oblivious keyKr via SARG04 protocol in
the way that (1) Bob knows Kr entirely, (2) Alice knows
every bit with probability p (p < 1), and (3) Bob does not
know which bits are known to Alice. Then, they conduct
∗Electronic address: gaofei˙bupt@hotmail.com
a classical postprocessing to ensure that Alice only knows
roughly one bit of the final key Kf . Finally, Bob uses Kf
to encrypt the database according to a shift claimed by
Alice in order that she can extract her wanted item from
the encrypted database. As the generation of quantum-
raw-oblivious-key and the postprocessing actually com-
pose a quantum oblivious key transfer (QOKT) protocol,
this kind of private query can be called “QOKT-based
private query” (QOKT-PQ).
QOKT-PQ has become a research hotpot today be-
cause it is loss-tolerant and can be used to large database.
Gao et al. [10] generalized J-protocol and proposed a
more flexible version in 2012. Panduranga Rao et al. [11]
gave efficient modifications of the classical postprocess-
ing. Then, Zhang et al. [12] designed a counterfactual
private query protocol. Wei et al. [13] proposed a proto-
col in which the user can obtain a multi-bit block from
database in one query. Then, Chan et al. [14] presented
a fault-tolerant protocol. Gao et al. [15] exhibited an
effective attack on several postprocessings and gave an
error-correction method for the oblivious key. Recently,
Wei et al. [16] proposed a practical protocol which can
resist the joint-measurement attack.
Though many obstacles for the application of QOKT-
PQ have been eliminated in succession, a troublesome
stalemate still exists in most protocols, i.e., the “trade-
off” relationship between database security and failure
probability. Concretely, better database security has to
be obtained at the cost of a higher failure probability,
and vice versa. For example, when a 105-bit database is
concerned in J-protocol, Alice can obtain 6.10 bits aver-
agely from database in one query with the failure prob-
ability being 0.002 if k = 7 (see TABLE 1 in Ref. [8] ),
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2but if k = 8 is selected to reduce the number of Alice’s
known bits to 105 × 0.258 = 1.53, the failure probability
will increase to (1 − 0.258)105 = 21.74%. Luckily, based
on a novel round-robin differential-phase-shift (RRDPS)
QKD protocol [17], Liu et al. [18] designed a private
query protocol (RRDPS-PQ protocol) which breaks this
stalemate. First, the number of database items an honest
user can obtain is always one, which offers ideal database
security (in previous protocols even an honest Alice gen-
erally can obtain several items instead of the ideal one
item in order that the failure probability can be restricted
to a small value). Second, the failure probability is al-
ways zero, meaning that the protocol will succeed all the
time if the noise is ignored.
Despite these achievements, some problems still need
to be further studied nowadays.
First, though the RRDPS-PQ protocol is perfect in
theory, there are some obstacles in application due to
the gap between ideal apparatuses and practical ones.
(1) Ideal single-photon source is required in this proto-
col, but it is not available today. Weak coherent source
(WCS) is generally used to replace it, then some pulses
would inevitably contain multiple photons, which has
been proven to open a serious security loophole for QKD
[19, 20]. Therefore, the security of RRDPS-PQ protocol
need to be further analyzed if WCS is used, and if it is
badly affected, its essential to find an effective method to
solve this problem. (2) A train of N + 1 coherent pulses
is needed when the database length equals to N , then
the length of the pulse train would become huge for large
database. With the increase of N , the implementation of
the protocol would become too complex to realize with
high speed and good stability (similar to the experimen-
tal setup in Ref. [21], too many optical delays and beam
splitters need to be placed accurately). In this sense,
RRDPS-PQ protocol is difficult to directly implement to
large database. How to remedy this flaw?
Second, the universal method to break the stalemate
between “database security” and “failure probability” in
general QOKT-PQ protocols is still awaited though it
was solved in RRDPS-PQ protocol when an ideal single-
photon source is used. However, ideal single-photon
source is not available today. More importantly, most
QOKT-PQ protocols are based on the BB84-like pro-
tocols (e.g., the SARG04 protocol used in [8]) rather
than the RRDPS-QKD protocol, hence finding a univer-
sal method to resolve this stalemate in general QOKT-
PQ protocols is an urgent task today.
Here, we focus on the above problems, and the follow-
ing contributions are achieved.
• We analyze the security of RRDPS-PQ protocol un-
der WCS, and find that Alice can obtain more items
than expected via multiple queries due to the ex-
istence of multiple photons, which clearly violates
the ideal database security.
• We give an improved RRDPS-PQ protocol with a
special “low-shift and addition” (LSA) technique,
which remedies the two flaws of the original pro-
tocol. Concretely, it can be used to query from
large database because it uses shorter pulse trains
(which are easier to prepare and implement) as in-
formation carriers. More importantly, it retains the
good features of the original RRDPS-PQ protocol
even under WCS, that is, it has ideal database se-
curity and zero failure probability despite the exis-
tence of multiple photons. Note that LSA is very
crucial here because it for the first time fulfills a
very difficult task in postprocessing, i.e., compress-
ing Alice’s information on the final key to one bit
quickly and meanwhile eliminating the failure prob-
ability. For simplicity, we call the feature of “ideal
database security and zero failure probability” as
“IDS-ZF” from now on.
• Inspired by the perfect performance of LSA, we use
it to construct a generic QOKT-PQ model with
the “IDS-ZF” feature. That is, a universal method
to realize both ideal database security and zero-
failure probability in general QOKT-PQ protocols
is exhibited.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We analyze
the security of RRDPS-PQ protocol under WCS in Sec-
tion 2, give an improved protocol in Section 3 and then
analyze its security in Section 4. In Section 5, we exhibit
a generic construction of QOKT-PQ protocols with the
“IDS-ZF” feature. Finally, a brief conclusion is given in
Section 6.
II. ANALYSIS OF RRDPS- PQ PROTOCOL
WITH WCS
A. Review of RRDPS-PQ protocol
When an N -bit database x1x2 · · ·xN is concerned, the
RRDPS-PQ protocol [18] is as follows.
1) Bob sends Alice a single-photon state |ΨS〉 of
N + 1 pulses according to a randomly chosen
(N + 1)-bit string S = s0, s1, · · · , sN with sk ∈
{0, 1} for k = 0, 1, 2, · · · , N . That is, |ΨS〉 =
1√
N+1
∑N
k=0(−1)sk |k〉, where |k〉 means that the
photon is in the k-th pulse.
2) When receiving |ΨS〉, Alice chooses a random r ∈
{1, 2, · · · , N}, splits each pulse by a half beam split-
ter and shifts the pulses in one light path by r.
Then she uses the interference circuits to randomly
get one of the values {sj⊕sj′}Nj=0, where j′ = j+r
mod (N + 1), and ⊕ denotes summation modulo 2.
Suppose the value Alice finally gets is st ⊕ st′ .
3) Alice publishes t and then they share an N -bit
oblivious key K
st ⊕ s0, st ⊕ s1, ..., st ⊕ st−1, st ⊕ st+1,...,st ⊕ sN .
3Note that Alice only knows the bit st ⊕ st′ in it.
4) Suppose Alice knows the j-th bit in K and wants
the i-th item in database, then she claims a shift
s = i− j.
5) Bob encrypts his database with K shifted by s, and
then sends the encrypted database to Alice.
6) Alice recovers the wanted item by her known bit in
K.
Owing to the ideal information carrier, i.e., a single
photon split into L + 1 pulses, Alice always detects one
photon in her site and obtains exactly one bit in K if the
noise and dark counting are ignored. It provides two fan-
tastic merits. First, the classical postprocessing to reduce
Alice’s knowledge on the oblivious key can be eliminated,
which obviously reduces the communications. Second, it
realizes the “IDS-ZF” feature, that is, an honest user
can only get her wanted item from database, and the
failure probability is always zero. However, these merits
can hardly do without the ideal carrier. As ideal sin-
gle photon source is not available with present technol-
ogy, we now consider using WCS to replace it. In this
case, there would inevitably have multiple photons in the
pulse train. As we know, the RRDPS-QKD protocol is
highly robust against similar attacks [22] induced by the
imperfect source, then what if the WCS is used in the
RRDPS-PQ protocol?
B. Security of RRDPS-PQ protocol under WCS
The existence of multiple photons gives Alice a chance
to obtain more information about the key K when weak
coherent source is used in RRDPS-PQ protocol. For ex-
ample, if the pulse train contains two photons and Alice
splits it into two paths to measure them according to a
random shift, e.g., 2, the two photons will be in differ-
ent pulses with high probability. Then, Alice may obtain
two phase differences, e.g., s2 ⊕ s4, s3 ⊕ s5. As there is
no classical postprocessing in this protocol, if Alice an-
nounces the time slot she has detected the photon is 2,
the final key would be
r1 = s2 ⊕ s0, r2 = s2 ⊕ s1, r3 = s2 ⊕ s3, r4 = s2 ⊕ s4,
r5 = s2 ⊕ s5, r6 = s2 ⊕ s6, · · · , rN = s2 ⊕ sN .
Clearly, Alice knows the bit r4 and the parity of r3 and r5
because r3⊕r5 = s3⊕s5. As shown in Ref. [15], knowing
parity information of the final key bits can help Alice
to obtain more database items in multiple queries. For
example, if Alice queries the 4-th bit x4 from database,
she would obtain x4 and the parity information x3 ⊕ x5
after receiving the encrypted database c1c2 · · · cN because
x4=c4 ⊕ r4 and x3 ⊕ x5=c3 ⊕ r3 ⊕ c5 ⊕ r5. Then, if she
retrieves x3 in the next query, she will at least obtain x3
and x5. That is, Alice obtains at least three items in two
queries.
We now estimate the influence of the above attack by
doing simulations similar to that in Ref.[15] to check how
many queries are needed for Alice to obtain one whole
database. Consider the most advantageous case for Al-
ice, that is, she claims a successful detection only when
obtaining no less than two phase differences. This attack
is possible when channel loss is high. Therefore in each
query, Alice knows one bit as well as the parity of two
other bits in the key, and she is allowed to select an opti-
mal shift so that the number of her known database items
is the highest. We execute this simulation 25 runs and
find that Alice can obtain one 104-bit database totally by
on average 5838 queries. It is clearly violates the ideal
database security, then how to retain this requirement
under imperfect source?
III. AN IMPROVED RRDPS-PQ PROTOCOL
As analyzed above, our main concerns to improve the
RRDPS-PQ protocol are as follows. (1) If the source is
imperfect, how to retain the merits of “ideal database
security” and “zero failure” (IDS-ZF)? (2) How to query
from large database? We now give an improved RRDPS-
PQ protocol as follows.
Suppose l is a small positive integer so that the train
of l + 1 coherent pulses can be easily prepared and im-
plemented with current technology. For simplicity, we
assume that the database length N is divisible by l, oth-
erwise we can achieve it by adding for example some bits
“0”s at the end of the database. A sketch of this protocol
is shown in Fig.1.
1) Bob sends many (l + 1)-pulse trains to Alice, and
each train is a single-photon of l + 1 sequential
coherent pulses with each pulse modulated with
phase 0 or pi randomly. Concretely, when preparing
one pulse train, Bob randomly selects one (l + 1)-
bit string S = s0s1 · · · sl with sk ∈ {0, 1} for
k = 0, 1, 2, · · · , l, and prepares the state |ΨS〉 =
1√
l+1
∑l
k=0(−1)sk |k〉,where |k〉means that the pho-
ton is in the k-th pulse.
2) For each received (l + 1)-pulse train, Alice splits it
by a half beam splitter and shifts the pulses in one
light path according to a random value chosen from
{1, 2, · · · , l}. Suppose one pulse train is prepared
with string S = s0s1 · · · sl and the shift Alice selects
for it is r, then Alice uses the interference circuits
to randomly get one of the values {sj ⊕ sj′′}lj=0,
where j′′ = j + r mod (l + 1), and ⊕ denotes
summation modulo 2. This phase is similar to that
in the original protocol [18]. Alice publishes t if the
value she finally gets is st ⊕ st′′ . As a result, Bob
knows all of the following l bits
st ⊕ s0, st ⊕ s1, ..., st ⊕ st−1, st ⊕ st+1,...,st ⊕ sl,
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FIG. 1: A sketch of the improved protocol. Here, N = 8 and l = 4. Suppose Alice wants the 6-th item x6 in database. Bob
sends many 5-pulse trains to Alice, then Alice uses the interference circuits to obtain one of the phase differences. As a result,
Alice knows exactly one bit in each 4 raw key bits (symbols “?” denote Alice’s unknown bits). Therefore, in the “low-shift and
addition” (LSA) phase (Step4.1), the shift Alice selects for each substring can be nicely located between -3 and 3. Here, she
claims shifts 1,-1 and 0 for the three substrings so that her known bits can be located in the 6-th positions (the red rectangles)
after the shifting. Clearly, she can obtain the 6-th final key bit and then use it to extract x6 directly.
while Alice knows only one bit st ⊕ st′′ . If Alice
claims that she has not detected any photon, they
discard this pulse train.
3) Alice and Bob should transmit enough pulse trains
so that they can share a kN -bit (k is a security
parameter and we will discuss it later) raw key in
total.
4) They cut the raw key into k N -bit substrings. Sup-
pose Alice wants the i-th item in database, then she
claims a shift Sj ∈ {−(l − 1),−(l − 2), · · · , l − 1}
for the j-th (j = 1, 2, · · · , k) substring so that she
knows the i-th bit after the shifting. These shifted
substrings are added bitwise to obtain a final key.
Obviously, Alice knows the i-th final key bit. Un-
like previous QOKT-PQ protocols, proper shift for
each substring here can be found in a small range
{−(l − 1),−(l − 2), · · · , l − 1} because Alice al-
ways knows one bit in each l raw key bits, hence
this phase can be called “low-shift and addition ”
(LSA).
5) Bob sends the database encrypted with the final
key to Alice. Clearly, Alice can recover the i-th
item with the i-th final bit she knows.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE IMPROVED
PROTOCOL
Similar to the analysis in the original RRDPS-PQ pro-
tocol, the user privacy in the improved protocol is also as-
sured in the sense of cheat-sensitivity. That is, if by some
attacks such as sending fake states and so on, Bob gets
some effective information on which item Alice wants,
he might give Alice the wrong value of the queried one,
which can be discovered later. Here, we only discuss the
database security as well as some other features of the
improved protocol.
5A. The “IDS-ZF” feature of the improved protocol
First, we show that the improved protocol can achieve
the “IDS-ZF” feature even under WCS, retaining the
merits of the original protocol. As Alice knows exactly
one bit in each l raw key bits if ideal single-photon source
is used, and also knows some parity information if WCS
is used (similar to that in Section 2.2), we only need to
prove this character under WCS.
Theorem 1 (IDS-ZF). The improved protocol can
achieve the “IDS-ZF” requirement even under weak co-
herent source (WCS).
Proof. Suppose µ is the mean photon number of the
WCS, then each pulse train contains m photons with
probability pm =
µm
m! e
−µ. Consider the most advanta-
geous case for Alice, that is, she can obtain m phase
differences if there are m photons in this train. There-
fore in each l raw key bits Alice knows one bit and m−1
(m ≥ 1) parity values of some other bits with probability
p′m = pm/
∑∞
i=1 pi. Assume Alice wants the i-th item in
database
In the LSA, we assume that after the adding of the first
k (which is a positive integer) substrings Alice knows nk
bits and mk parity-correlated bits in the output string S.
Clearly, nk+1 ≤ nk and mk+1 ≤ mk. Alice can always
know at least one bit in S because the shifts are selected
by herself, that is, nk ≥ 1 holds for any positive integer
k and the failure probability will always be 0.
We now show that nk = 1 and mk = 0 can be achieved
quickly in LSA, which assures the ideal database security
of this protocol. First, Alice has to choose a suitable low
shift for the (k+1)-th substring so that she knows the i-th
bit after shifting, and the other nk−1 known bits would
be kept known after the next adding with probability 1l ,
that is
nk+1 = 1 + (nk − 1)/l. (1)
Second, the known parity-correlated bits must be the
sum of known bits or known correlated bits. As the
probability of “unknown and uncorrelated” bits in the
raw key is
p′′ = l−1l p
′
1 +
l−3
l p
′
2 + · · · ≥ l−1l p′1,
we have
mk+1 ≤ mk · (1− p′′) ≤ mk · (1− l − 1
l
p′1). (2)
Note that p′1 is larger than 0.5 because µ is generally
significantly smaller than 1, hence Eqs. (1-2) show that
nk = 1 and mk = 0 can be achieved quickly with the
increase of k.
Finally, we prove that ideal database security can be
achieved even when Alice selects to obtain as many items
as possible rather than one predetermined item. That
is, for each substring Alice selects an optimal shift from
{−(l − 1),−(l − 2), · · · , (l − 1)} so that after the adding
the number of her known bits is the highest. We check
the case that nk+1 = nk first. Suppose Si is the set of
the substrings which can retain nk+1 = nk for the shift
i in the next adding. Obviously, Si is determined by the
intervals of the nk bits Alice needs to know. For example,
when l = 4 and the output of the first k substrings is
S =“???? ?0?? ??1? ???? ???0” (“?” is Alice’s unknown
bit),
S1 = {‘#### d??? ?d?? #### ??d?’}.
Here, ‘d’ is Alice’s known bit, and ‘#’ can be Alice’s
known or unknown bit. That is, nk+1 = nk can be
achieved if the (k+1)-th substring is anyone of S1 and its
shift is 1. Clearly for any i ∈ {−(l−1),−(l−2), · · · , (l−
1)}, Si appears with probability no more than 1lnk , that
is, p(Si) ≤ 1lnk . Therefore the probability that nk+1 = nk
can be written as
p(nk+1 = nk) = p(S−(l−1)
⋃
S−(l−2)
⋃
· · ·S(l−1))
≤
l−1∑
i=−(l−1)
p(Si) ≤ 2l − 1
lnk
When nk ≥ 2, we have
p(nk+1 < nk) = 1− p(nk+1 = nk) ≥ ( l − 1
l
)2. (3)
That is, once one more substring is shifted and added in
LSA, Alice’s known bits will strictly decrease with prob-
ability no less than ( l−1l )
2 as long as nk ≥ 2. Therefore,
nk = 1 can be achieved if proper k is selected.
Now, to show the high efficiency of the LSA in com-
pressing Alice’s knowledge on the oblivious key and es-
timate the WCS’s influence on database security, we do
simulations to choose proper value of k (i.e., the number
of substrings combined in LSA to obtain a final key) for
both honest and malicious Alice to ensure ideal database
security. Here, by “honest” we mean that Alice does not
try to illegally obtain more database items though she ac-
tually can obtain some parity information when multiple
photons exist, that is, she ignores the parity information
and executes the protocol faithfully. For honest Alice,
the simulation is as follows.
(a) Define database length N , the length of pulse train
l, retrieval address i and set k = 1.
(b) (I) One l-bit block in which Alice knows ex-
actly one bit is generated. (II) Repeat (I) un-
til an N -bit string S is generated and record the
known/unknown bits in it.
(c) S is shifted by a value s ∈ {−(l−1),−(l−2), · · · , l−
1} according to the retrieval address i.
6(d) (I) Repeat step (b) to generate a new N -bit string
S′; (II) S′ is shifted by a value s ∈ {−(l− 1),−(l−
2), · · · , l − 1} according to the retrieval address i,
then S and S′ are bitwise added. Denote the output
of the adding as S and record the known/unknown
bits in it, then set k = k + 1.
(e) Repeat step (d) until Alice knows only one bit in
S, then output the value of k.
For malicious Alice, the simulation is as follows.
(a) Define N , l, µ and set k = 1. Here, µ is the mean
photon number of the WCS. Consider the most ad-
vantageous case for Alice, that is, she can obtain
m phase differences if there are m photons in this
train and she announces a successful detection only
when she obtains no less than two phase differences.
Therefore in each l raw key bits Alice knows one bit
and m− 1 (m ≥ 2) parity values of some other bits
with probability p′m = pm/
∑∞
i=2 pi.
(b) (I) One l-bit block with respect to µ is generated.
Concretely in this block, Alice knows exactly one
bit and m− 1 parity values of some other bits with
probability p′m for m = 2, 3, · · · . (II) Repeat (I)
until an N -bit string S is generated, and record
the known, unknown and parity-correlated bits in
it.
(c) (I) Repeat (b) to generate a new N -bit string S′;
(II) Optimal shifts for S and S′ are selected in
{−(l−1),−(l−2), · · · , l−1} so that after the adding
of the shifted S and S′ the number of Alice’s known
bits is the highest. (III) Denote the output of the
adding as S and record the known, unknown and
parity-correlated bits in it, then set k = k + 1.
(d) (I) Repeat (b) to generate a new N -bit string S′;
(II) An optimal shift s ∈ {−(l−1),−(l−2), · · · , l−
1} for S′ is selected so that after the adding of S and
the shifted S′ the number of Alice’s known bits is
the highest. (III) Denote the output of the adding
as S and record the known, unknown and parity-
correlated bits in it, then set k = k + 1.
(e) Repeat step (d) until Alice knows only one bit in
S, then output the value of k.
One concrete simulation for malicious Alice is given in
Fig.2, which shows that both the bits and the parity in-
formation Alice knows are reduced quickly with the in-
crease of k. When k = 6, Alice knows only one final bit
and the ideal database security is achieved. To give a suf-
ficiently secure k, we choose proper kH for honest Alice
and kM for malicious one to ensure ideal database secu-
rity by executing the above simulations 25 runs for l = 8,
and collect the maximum, minimum, mean and standard
deviation (std) of kH(M) (see Table 1) for comparison.
Ideal database security can be achieved quickly for both
honest and malicious Alice though the values of kM are
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FIG. 2: A simulation of the LSA to reduce malicious Alice’s
knowledge on the final key to only one bit under WCS. Here,
l = 8, N = 2500 and µ = 0.1. We draw a picture of the
database where any item is represented by a square, and dye
the unknown items as black, the known ones white, and the
parity-correlated ones red. Clearly, Alice’s known bits as well
as the parity information are reduced quickly with the in-
crease of k. When k = 6, Alice knows only one bit in the
final key, which indicates the ideal database security of this
protocol.
TABLE I: For different N , proper choices of kH(M) for honest
(malicious) Alice. in 25 simulations with l = 8 and µ = 0.1.
N 900 2500 104 90000
kH
maximum 5 7 7 8
minimum 3 4 4 5
mean 3.96 4.96 5.28 6.32
std 0.5385 0.8406 0.6782 0.6904
kM
maximum 6 7 8 9
minimum 4 4 5 6
mean 4.16 4.92 5.84 7.08
std 0.4726 0.7024 0.8 0.8426
generally a little larger than that of kH . Note that the
abilities of malicious Alice are sufficiently enlarged be-
cause her attack would be detected by Bob owing to the
superhigh rate of lost photons. Generally k can be set
with the mean value of kM to realize the ideal database
security, and for insurance purposes, k can be set with
the maximum value of kM . As shown in Table 1, when
N = 104, l = 8 and µ = 0.1, k = 8 is large enough to
ensure ideal database security for both honest and mali-
cious Alice.
B. Some other features of the improved protocol
The improved protocol is more practical. It retains the
“IDS-ZF” feature even under WCS, which means that it
is robust against the attack induced by imperfect source.
Moreover, it can be used to large database because the
7information carries, i.e., the (l + 1)-pulse trains with l
being a small positive integer, are much easier to prepare
and implement.
The improved protocol is loss-tolerant. Though Al-
ice can announce a successful detection only when she
detects multiple photons in one pulse train, her extra in-
formation will be compressed quickly in the LSA, and
Bob generally can find this attack due to the superhigh
rate of lost photons.
The improved protocol can resist the quantum mem-
ory attack. Alice cannot gain any benefit by storing the
photons for a delayed measurement because Bob would
not leak any information about the photons later.
V. GENERIC MODEL OF QOKT-PQ
PROTOCOLS WITH “IDS-ZF” FEATURE
In previous years, appropriate postprocessing of the
raw key has been regarded as the key phase to achieve
both “higher database security” and “lower failure proba-
bility”. On one hand, to realize higher database security,
Alice’s information on the oblivious key has to be further
compressed by certain method such as bitwise adding.
On the other hand, to reduce the failure probability, Al-
ice should be allowed to select shifts for the substrings
in order that she can know at least one final key bit.
Actually, some sophisticated methods combining “shifts
selected by Alice” and “bitwise adding” have been given
in previous QOKT-PQ protocols.
• Jacobi et al. [8] gave a sophisticated method to
improve the database security, i.e., executing the
QOKT phase (including “quantum raw oblivious
key distribution” and “bitwise adding”) twice to
create two final keys in which Alice knows only sev-
eral bits, and then combining them with a shift
chosen by Alice. As a result, Alice knows ex-
actly one bit finally with overwhelming probabil-
ity, but the failure probability may increase dra-
matically. For example, when a 104-bit database is
concerned, the failure probability would be on av-
erage 0.087 (see Table 1 in [8]) in one run of the
QOKT, but as it need to be executed twice when
the sophisticated method is used, at least one final
key is totally unknown to Alice with probability
1− (1− 0.087)2 = 0.1664, that is, the failure prob-
ability would increase to 16.64%.
• Gao et al. [15] used the “shift-addition” method
to further compress Alice’s information on some
middle keys (which are actually oblivious keys)
created by the error correction of the raw oblivi-
ous key. That is, Alice freely chooses a shift for
each middle key before bitwise adding. It com-
presses Alice’s known bits dramatically and makes
the error-correction of the oblivious key more prac-
tical. However, as one concrete simulation of the
shift-addition (see Table 2 in [15]) shows, it is very
difficult to reduce Alice’s knowledge on the final key
to less than 3 bits even with a dramatic increase of
k, that is, ideal database security is nearly impos-
sible via acceptable communications.
Therefore, though in general QOKT-PQ protocols the
stalemate between “database security” and “failure prob-
ability” has been eased by the “shift-addition” method,
it is still far from “well-resolved”. Then, why it can be
resolved perfectly in the improved RRDPS-PQ protocol?
Actually in this protocol Alice knows at least one bit in
each l raw key bits, which can limit the shifts chosen by
Alice to a small range {−(l − 1),−(l − 2), · · · , (l − 1)}.
Note that “low-shift” is very important to realize ideal
database security via “acceptable communications” be-
cause it greatly reduces Alice’s advantage in selecting
optimal shifts. As Eq.(3) shows, with probability no
less than ( l−1l )
2 Alice’s known bits would be strictly de-
creased with the increase of k as long as nk ≥ 2. That
is, it is easy to further compress Alice’s known bits even
when nk is small, which is quite different from previous
“ shift-addition” method (note that in [15], even with a
sharp increase of k, it is very difficult to reduce Alice’s
known bits when nk=3 ).
A natural question is, can we use the LSA skill in gen-
eral QOKT-PQ protocols to realize ideal database secu-
rity as well as “zero-failure” quickly? As analyzed above,
only when Alice knows at least one bit in each l (l N)
raw key bits, the shift can be limited to a small range and
the LSA can be used to realize the feature of “IDE-ZF”
quickly.
A. Generic QOKT-PQ model with the “IDS-ZF”
feature
In this section, we generalize the LSA technique and
give a generic QOKT-PQ model with the “IDS-ZF” fea-
ture as follows.
For simplicity, we assume that the database length N
is divisible by l, otherwise we can achieve it by appending
some bits at the end of the database.
1) Quantum oblivious key distribution. Alice and
Bob share a raw oblivious key with approximately
kN/(1− (1− l)l) bits via certain QKD protocol (k
is a security parameter).
2) Block-sifting. To ensure that Alice knows at least
one bit in each l raw key bits, they divide the
raw key into l-bit blocks, then Alice announces
which blocks are totally unknown to her and should
be discarded. The proportion of discarded blocks
should be about pdiscard = (1− p)l. The remaining
raw key should be composed of kN bits, i.e., kNl
blocks, and in each block Alice knows at least one
bit.
3) Low-shift and addition (LSA). Alice and Bob divide
the raw key into k substrings with equal length N .
8Then Alice announces a shift in {−(l − 1),−(l −
2), · · · , (l− 1)} for each substring according to her
wanted item. These shifted substrings are bitwise
added to obtain a final key.
4) Retrieval. Bob sends Alice the database encrypted
with the final key in the manner of one time pad.
Clearly, Alice can obtain the wanted database item
by her known final bit.
B. Security and parameters
After the “Block-sifting”, the probability of Alice’s
known bits in the raw key would be p′ = p
1−(1−p)l and
Alice knows at least one bit in each l raw key bits. As
a result, the generic QOPT-PQ model can be proved to
realize the feature of “IDE-ZF” via similar method of
Theorem 1. Hence, we omit the proof and only give the
following theorem here.
Theorem 2. The generic “QOKT-PQ” model can real-
ize both ideal database security and zero-failure probabil-
ity (IDE-ZF).
Now we turn to examine how quickly the LSA can re-
duce Alice’s information on the final key to one bit. To
give sufficiently secure parameters, we also give Alice the
advantage of choosing suitable retrieval address and op-
timal shifts here. Concretely, we do simulation to select
proper k as follows.
(a) Define the parameters N , p, l, nA. Here, nA is
the number of database items Alice is expected to
obtain. Set k = 1 and n′ = N
1−(1−p)l .
(b) Key generation and Block-sifting. (I) One n′-bit
string with respect to p is generated. Concretely,
Bob knows the string completely while Alice knows
every bit with probability p. (II) Divide the string
into l-bit blocks, discard the ones which are com-
pletely unknown to Alice. The remaining string S
should be composed of N/l blocks. Record Alice’s
known/unknown bits in it.
(c) (I) Repeat step (b) to generate a new string S′; (II)
Select optimal shifts from {−(l−1),−(l−2), · · · , l−
1} for S and S′ in order that after the adding of
the shifted S and S′ the number of known bits is
the highest. (III) Denote the output of adding as S
and record Alice’s known/unknown bits in it, then
set k = k + 1.
(d) (I) Repeat step (b) to generate a new string S′;
(II) Select an optimal shift s ∈ {−(l − 1),−(l −
2), · · · , l − 1} for S′ in order that after the bit-
wise adding of S and the shifted S′ the number of
known bits is the highest. (III) Denote the out-
put of the bitwise adding as S and record Alice’s
known/unknown bits in it, then set k = k + 1.
TABLE II: Proper kl in the generic QOKT-PQ model for
different block lengths l and p = 0.25 to ensue that Alice can
obtain only nA database items.
nA=3 nA=2 nA=1 pdiscard
k8 7.52 8.57 12.04 0.1001
N = 104 k10 7.32 8.48 12.74 0.0563
k16 7.41 8.78 16.13 0.010
k8 9.33 10.29 13.43 0.1001
N = 105 k10 9.10 10.33 14.62 0.0563
k16 9.29 10.66 17.55 0.010
(e) Repeat step (d) until Alice knows only nA bits in
S, then output the value of k.
We set p = 0.25 and simulate 100 runs for different
N , l and nA, and then give proper choices of k in Table
2. Here, kl represents the average value of k for block
length l. We can find that both high database security
(i.e., nA ≤ 3 ) and “ideal database security” (i.e., nA=1)
can be achieved quickly. For example, when N = 104 and
l = 10, the mean value of k to ensure that Alice obtains
only one final bit is 12.74, and the discarded blocks only
occupy 5.63%, which is clearly an acceptable communi-
cation.
To further emphasize the importance of “low shift” for
ideal database security, we compare the effects of dif-
ferent shifts in compressing Alice’s information in Fig.3.
Concretely when p = 0.25 , if the shifts are randomly
chosen, it is very difficult to reduce the number of Alice’s
known bits to less than 5 even when k has increased to 24
or much bigger values, which means that ideal database
security is nearly impossible via acceptable communica-
tions. On the contrary, if the shifts are restricted to
{−(l−1),−(l−2), · · · , l−1} with l = 8, 10 or 16, the ef-
ficiency of compressing increases significantly and k = 16
is large enough to achieve ideal database security. That
is why the LSA technique can be used to perfectly ad-
dress the troublesome stalemate of “database security”
and “failure probability” in general QOKT-PQ protocol.
Finally, we emphasize the following two points about
our generic QOKT-PQ model with the “IDS-ZF” feature.
• The raw oblivious key must be random, that is,
the bits Alice knows must be at random positions
and she cannot disturb the randomness, otherwise
the LSA would be invalid in compressing Alice’s
known bits. For example, suppose Alice can make
the first pl bits of each block known to her and
keep the remaining ones unknown, then after the
LSA, she would know about pN final key bits by
announcing that each shift equals to 0. Therefore,
the randomness of the raw key is necessary. Luckily,
it would not affect the universality of our model
because some skillful methods, such as the “shift-
and-permutation” in [16], can be used to ensure the
randomness of the oblivious key effectively.
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FIG. 3: Effects of different shifts in compressing Alice’s infor-
mation. Here, p = 0.25. When the shifts are restricted to −l
and l (with l = 8, 10, or 16), nA is reduced to 1 quickly with
the increase of k, but if the shifts are randomly chosen, it is
very difficult to reduce the number of Alice’s known final bits
to less than 5, which shows that the “low-shift” is essential in
realizing ideal database security.
• Block length l should be selected from two aspects.
First, it should restrict pdiscard to a small value. A
small pdiscard means a small amount of discarded
bits and a saving in communications. More im-
portantly, Alice may obtain benefit in arranging
the alignment of the blocks in LSA by telling a lie
that certain blocks are completely unknown and
should be discarded. As the proportion of dis-
carded blocks should be about pdiscard, this ben-
efit can be restricted to a small extent if pdiscard
is small. Second, proper l should ensure a relative
high efficiency of compressing Alice’s information.
As Table 2 shows, kl may increase with the growth
of l, which clearly means a reduction in the com-
pression efficiency. When p = 0.25, l = 10 is a
better choice compared to l = 8 (which induces a
high pdiscard) and l = 16 (which results in an obvi-
ous reduction in compression efficiency.)
VI. CONCLUSION
With the aid of the LSA technique, we present an im-
proved RRDPS-PQ protocol which not only can be used
to retrieve from large database but also retains the mer-
its of “IDS-ZF” even under imperfect source. Inspired
by this, we generalize the LSA technique and construct
a generic QOKT-PQ model with the “IDS-ZF” feature,
thus breaking the troublesome stalemate of “database
security” and “failure probability” in general QOKT-PQ
protocols completely.
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